


















ABSTRACT. I present in this paper an analysis of the Simulation argument from a                           
dialectical contextualist's standpoint. This analysis is grounded on the reference class                     
problem. I begin with describing Bostrom’s Simulation Argument step­by­step. I                   
identify then the reference class within the Simulation argument. I also point out a                           
reference class problem, by applying the argument successively to several                   
references classes: aware­simulations, rough­simulations and cyborg­type           
simulations. Finally, I point out that there are three levels of conclusion within the                           








I shall propose in what follows a solution to solve the problem posed by the Simulation                               
argument, recently described by Nick Bostrom (2003). I shall first attempt to describe in detail                             
the Simulation argument, by exposing in particular its inherent problem. I will show then how a                               
solution can be brought to such a problem, based on the analysis of the reference class which                                 
underlies the Simulation argument, and without it being necessary to give up one's                         
pretheoretical intuitions. 
The general idea which underlies the Simulation argument (SA, for short) can be                         
expressed as follows. It is very likely that post­human civilizations will possess a calculus                           
computing power completely out of proportion with the one which is ours at present time.                             
Such an extraordinary computing power should confer them the capacity to implement                       
completely realistic human simulations, such in particular that the inhabitants of these                       
simulations would be conscious of their own existence, in every respect similar to ours. In                             
such a context, we can think that it is likely that post­human civilizations will actually dedicate a                                 
part of their computing resources to realize simulations of the human civilizations which                         
preceded them. In this case, the number of the simulated human beings should very largely                             
encompass that of the genuine human beings. In such conditions, the fact of taking into                             
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 account the mere fact that we exist leads to the conclusion that it is more likely that we belong                                     
to the simulated human beings, rather than to the genuine ones. 







The first step of the reasoning consists in considering, by dichotomy, that either (i) humankind                             
will face a nearest extinction, or (ii) she will pursue its existence in the distant future. The first                                   
of these two hypotheses constitutes the disjunct (1) of the argument. We consider then the                             
hypothesis according to which the humanity will not face a nearest extinction and will then                             
pursue its existence through numerous millenniums. In such a case, we can also consider that                             
it is likely that the post­human civilizations will possess at the same time the technology and                               
the required capacities to realize human beings' simulations. A new dichotomy then follows:                         
either (i) these post­human civilizations will not realize such simulations—it consists of the                         
disjunct (2) of the argument; or (ii) these post­human civilizations will actually realize such                           
simulations. In this last case, it will follow that the number of simulated human beings will                               
largely exceed that of the human beings. The probability to live in a simulation will thus be                                 
much greater than that to live as an ordinary human being. It follows then the conclusion that                                 
we, inhabitants of the Earth, probably live in a simulation realized by a post­human civilization.                             
This last conclusion constitutes the disjunct (3) of the argument. An additional step leads then                             









(6)  the post­human civilizations will be capable of realizing             
human beings' simulations 
from (5)
(7)  either the post­human civilizations will not realize human             
beings' simulations, or they will realize them 
dichotomy 2
(2)  the post­human civilizations will not realize human beings'             
simulations 
hypothesis 2.1
(8)  the post­human civilizations will realize human beings'           
simulations 
hypothesis 2.2












It is also worth mentioning an element which results from the interpretation of the argument.                             
For as Bostrom himself (2005) notes, the Simulation argument must not be wrongly                         
interpreted. It is not indeed an argument which leads to the conclusion that (3) is true, namely                                 
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 that we currently live in a simulation realized by a post­human civilization. The core of the                               
Simulation argument lies then in the fact that the propositions (1), (2) or (3) are equiprobable. 
This nuance of interpretation being mentioned, the Simulation argument does not however                       
miss to raise a problem. For the argument leads to the conclusion that one of the                               
propositions (1), (2) or (3) at least is true, and that in the situation of ignorance where we are,                                     
we can consider them as equiprobable. As Bostrom himself puts it: “In the dark forest of our                                 
current ignorance, it seems sensible to apportion one's credence roughly evenly between (1),                         
(2) and (3).” (Bostrom 2003). However, according to our pre­theoretical intuition, the                       
probability of (3) is null or at best extremely close to 0. So, the conclusion of the argument has                                     
for consequence to make pass the probability that (3) is the true, from zero to a probability of                                   
about 1/3. So, the problem posed by SA is precisely that it makes shift—via its disjunctive                               
conclusion—a probability of zero or of near zero concerning (3) to a much more considerable                             
probability of about 1/3. For a probability of 1/3 concerning proposition (1) and (2) has                             
nothing shocking a priori, but reveals itself on the other hand completely counter­intuitive as                           
regards proposition (3). It is in this sense that we can speak of the problem posed by the                                   
Simulation argument and of the need of looking for a solution to the latter. 
In a preliminary way, it is worth wondering about what constitutes the paradoxical nature of                             
SA. What is it indeed that confers a paradoxical aspect to SA? For SA distinguishes itself                               
from the class of paradoxes that lead to a contradiction. In the paradoxes such as the Liar or                                   
the sorites paradox, the corresponding reasoning leads to a contradiction: the Liar is both                           
true and false. In the sorites paradox, an object containing a certain number of grains of sand                                 
is both a heap and a non­heap. No such thing manifests itself at the level of SA which                                   
belongs, from this point of view, to a different class of paradoxes of which is also part the                                   
Doomsday argument. It consists indeed of a class of paradoxes the conclusion of which                           
presents a counter­intuitive nature, and comes in conflict with the whole set of our beliefs. In                               
the Doomsday argument, the conclusion according to which the fact of taking into                         
consideration our own birth rank within the class of the human beings having never existed                             
results in the fact that a doomsday is much more likely than we would have possibly                               
envisaged initially, comes to strike the set of all our beliefs. In a similar way, what appears                                 
finally here as paradoxical, in first analysis, is that SA leads to a probability of the hypothesis                                 






The conclusion of the reasoning which underlies SA, based on the calculation of the future                             
ratio between the real human beings and the simulated ones, as it proves to be                             
counter­intuitive, results nevertheless from a reasoning which seems a priori valid. However,                       
such a reasoning leads to an interrogation, which is associated with the reference class                           
which is inherent to the argument itself. Indeed, it turns out that SA contains, in an indirect                                 1
way, a specific class of reference, which is that of the human beings' simulations. But what is                                 
it then that constitutes a simulation? The original argument refers, in an implicit way, to a                               
reference class which is that of virtual simulations of human beings, of a very high quality and                                 
by nature indiscernible from the genuine ones. However, a certain ambiguity lies in the mere                             
1 William Eckhardt (2013, p. 15) considers that—in the same way as with the Doomsday argument (Eckhardt                                 
1993, 1997, Franceschi 2009)—the problem inherent to SA results from the use of reverse­causality and from                               
the problem associated with the definition of the reference class: 'if simulated, are you random among human                                 
sims? hominid sims? conscious sims?'. 
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 notion of simulation and the question arises of the applicability of SA to other types of human                                 
beings' simulations. We can indeed conceive of somewhat different types of simulations                       2
which, in an intuitive way, also enter the scope of the argument. 
It is possible to imagine, first, a type of simulations in every respect identical to those                               
described in the original argument, i.e. almost indiscernible from genuine human beings, but                         
with the only difference that they would be aware of their own nature of simulation. The only                                 
difference with the type of simulation described in the original argument would thus be that                             
these last simulations would clearly be conscious of being not authentic human beings. A                           
priori, nothing excludes that the post­humans would choose to implement any such                       
simulations and intuitively, SA is also susceptible of applying to this particular type of                           
simulations. 
In the same way, SA refers implicitly to sophisticated simulations, of very high quality,                           
which are by nature indiscernible from authentic human beings. However, we can conceive of                           
various degrees in the quality of the human simulations. So the question notably arises of                             
whether we can include in the reference class of SA some virtual simulations of a very slightly                                 
lower quality? With any such simulations, the nature of simulation which constitutes their deep                           
identity would be susceptible of being one day discovered by the very subject. If the argument                               
has to apply to this class of simulations, the question then arises of its applicability to other                                 
types of simulations of this nature, because we can conceive of numerous intermediate                         
degrees between on the one hand, the indiscernible simulations and on the other hand, the                             
simulations which we are currently capable of realizing, notably by means of computer                         
generated images. So, the question does arise of whether the reference class of SA can go                               
as far as to include simulations of lower quality than those evoked in the original argument? 
Finally, it appears that SA also ‘works’ if we apply it to human beings whose brain is                                 
interfaced with uploads, simulations of the human mind including memorized events,                     
knowledge, personality's traits, ways of reasoning, etc. relative to a given individual. We can                           
imagine indeed that in a not very distant future, the emulation of the human brain could be                                 
achieved (Moravec 1998, Sandberg & Bostrom 2008, Garis & al. 2010), so that the                           
realization of uploads could become common and intensively used. A very large number of                           
uploads could be so realized and used in different purposes: scientific, cultural, social,                         
utilitarian, etc. If we assimilate then the uploads to the simulations of SA, the argument also                               
works. In a sense, the human beings endowed with uploads can be considered as                           
simulations of partial nature, which only concern the brain or a part of the brain, even though                                 
the rest of the human body remains authentic and not simulated. In such a case, the human                                 
beings of which only the brain is simulated by means of an upload, can be assimilated to a                                   
particular type of cyborgs. We can so raise the general question of to what extent the class of                                   
the simulations of SA can be widened to partial simulations and to the types of cyborgs who                                 
have just been described. We can indeed conceive of cyborgs of various types, depending                           
on the parts of the body and organs of replacement or substitution which are theirs. So the                                 
question does arise of to what extent SA also applies to this type of cyborgs? 
As we can see it, the very question of the definition of the reference class for SA leads to                                     
wonder about the inclusion or not within the scope of SA of several types of simulations.                               
2 We shall set aside here the question of whether or not we need to take into account an infinite number of                                           
simulated human beings. Such could be the case if the ultimate level of reality was abstract. In this case, the                                       
reference class could include simulated human beings who would identify themselves, for example, with                           
matrices of very large integer numbers. But Bostrom answers such an objection in his FAQ                             
(www.simulation­argument.com/faq.html) and indicates that in this case, the calculations do not apply any                         
more (the denominator is infinite) and the ratio is not defined. We shall thus leave aside this hypothesis, by                                     
concentrating our argumentation on what constitutes the core of SA, i.e. the case where the number of human                                   
beings' simulations is finite. 
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 Without pretending to be exhaustive, we can mention at this stage, among the latter:                           
aware­simulations, the more or less rough­simulations and the partial simulations of a                       
cyborg­type. The question of the definition of the reference class for SA seems then closely                             
related to the nature of the future taxonomy of the beings and creatures which will populate the                                 
Earth in a near or distant future. 
At this step, it turns out in first approach that the types of human beings' simulations                               
present a somewhat varied nature, and that we can define the reference class of the                             
simulations in several ways. We could then choose the reference class in a more or less                               






At this stage, we still cannot speak veritably of a reference class problem within SA. For it                                 
indeed, we need to show that the choice of the one or the other reference class has                                 
completely different consequences at the level of the argument, and in particular that the                           
nature of its conclusion finds itself modified in a fundamental way. In what follows, we shall                               
from now on attempt to show that according to the choice of the one or the other reference                                   
class, some radically different conclusions follow at the level of the very argument and that                             
consequently, there exists well a reference class problem within SA. For this purpose, we                           
shall consider successively several reference classes, by attaching ourselves to show that                       
some conclusions of a fundamentally different nature result from them at the level of the                             
argument itself. 
The original version of SA stages implicitly human beings' simulations of a certain type.                           
They consist of virtual type simulations, almost indiscernible for ourselves and which present                         
then a very high degree of sophistication. More still, they consist of a type of simulations which                                 
are not aware that they are themselves simulated and which are thus persuaded to be                             
genuine human beings. This results implicitly of the terms of the argument itself and in                             
particular, of the inference from (9) to (3) which leads to conclude that ‘we’ currently live in an                                   
indiscernible simulation realized by the post­humans. In fact, it consists of simulations which                         
are somewhat abused and deceived by the post­humans as regards their true identity. For                           
the needs of the present discussion, we shall term quasi­humans­ the simulated human                         
beings who are not aware that they are themselves simulated. 
At this step, it turns out that we can also conceive of indiscernible simulations which                             
present a completely identical degree of sophistication but which, on the contrary, would be                           
aware that they are simulated. We shall then term quasi­humans+ those simulated human                         
beings who are aware that they are themselves simulations. Such simulations are in every                           
respect identical to the quasi­humans­ to which SA refers implicitly, with the only difference                           
that they are this time clearly aware of their intrinsic nature of simulation. In an intuitive way,                                 
SA also applies to this type of simulation. A priori, we lack the justification to exclude such a                                   
type of simulations. More still, several reasons lead to think that the quasi­humans+ could be                             
more numerous than the quasi­humans­. For ethical reasons (i) first, we can think that the                             
post­humans could be inclined to prefer quasi­humans+ to quasi­humans­. For the fact of                         
conferring an existence to the quasi­humans­ constitutes a deceit on their real identity, while                           
such an inconvenient is absent with regard to quasi­humans+. Such a deceit could be                           
reasonably considered as unethical and lead to one or the other form of quasi­humans­                           
interdiction. Another reason (ii) militates for the fact of not pushing aside a priori those human                               
beings' simulations that are aware of their own nature of simulation. We can think indeed that                               
the level of intelligence acquired by certain quasi­human beings in a near future could be                             
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 extremely high and make that in this case, the simulations would become very quickly aware                             
that they are themselves simulations. We can think that starting from a certain degree of                             
intelligence, and in particular the one susceptible of being obtained by humankind in a not                             
very distant future (Kurtzweil 2000, 2005, Bostrom 2006), the quasi­humans should be                       
able—at least much more easily than at present—to collect the evidence that they are the                             
object of a simulation. Moreover, the concept of ‘simulation which is unaware that it is a                               
simulation’ could be plagued with contradiction, because it would then be necessary to limit                           
its intelligence and from then on, it would not consist any more of an indiscernible and enough                                 
realistic simulation. These two reasons suggest that the quasi­humans+ could well exist in                         
greater number than the quasi­humans­. 
At this stage, it turns out to be necessary to envisage the consequences of the                             
consideration of the quasi­humans+ within the reference class of the simulations inherent to                         
SA. For that purpose, let us consider first the variation of SA (let us call it SA*) which applies,                                     
in an exclusive way, to the class of the quasi­humans+. Such a choice has no consequence,                               
first, on the disjunct (1) of SA, which refers to a possible next disappearance of our humanity.                                 
It has no effect either on the disjunct (2), according to which the post­humans will not realize                                 
quasi­humans+, i.e. aware­simulations of human beings. On the other hand, the choice of                         
such a reference class has a direct consequence on the disjunct (3) of SA. Certainly, it                               
follows, in the same way as with the original argument, the first­level conclusion according to                             
which the number of quasi­humans+ will largely exceed the number of genuine human beings                           
(the disproportion). However, from now, the second­level conclusion according to which ‘we’                       
currently are quasi­humans+, does not follow any more. Indeed, such a conclusion (let us term                             
it the self­applicability) does no longer apply to us from now on, since we are not conscious of                                   
being simulated and are fully convinced of being genuine human beings. In effect, what                           
constitutes the disturbing conclusion of SA does not result any more from now on from step                               
(9), for we cannot identify ourselves with the quasi­humans+, the latter being clearly aware                           
that they live in a simulation. So, unlike the original version of SA based on the reference                                 
class which associates the human beings with the quasi­humans­, this new version                       
associating the human beings and the quasi­humans+, is not related to such a disturbing                           
conclusion. The conclusion which follows from now on, as we can see it, turns out to be                                 
completely reassuring, and in any case very different from that, profoundly disturbing, which                         
results from the original argument. 
At this step, it turns out that a question arises: must we identify, in the context of SA, the                                     
reference class with the quasi­humans­ or with the quasi­humans+? It turns out that no                           
objective element, in the statement of SA, comes to justify the a priori choice of the                               
quasi­humans­ or of the quasi­humans+. So, any version of the argument which contains the                           
preferential choice of either the quasi­humans­ or the quasi­humans+ can be considered as                         
exemplifying a bias. Such is then the case for the original version of SA, which contains then a                                   
bias in favour of the quasi­humans­, which results from the choice by Bostrom of a class of                                 
simulations which assimilates itself exclusively with the quasi­humans­, i.e. simulations which                     
are unaware of their nature of simulations and which are consequently abused and deceived                           
by the post­humans on the true nature of their identity. And such is also the case for SA* the                                     
alternate version of SA which has been just described, which contains a specific bias in                             
favour of the quasi­humans+, i.e. simulations that are aware of their own nature of simulation.                             
However, the choice of the reference class proves here to be fundamental, for it contains an                               
essential consequence: if we choose a reference class which associates the human beings                         
with the quasi­humans­, it results from it the disturbing conclusion that we currently very                           
probably live in a simulation. On the other hand, if we choose a reference class which                               
associates the human beings with the quasi­humans+, if follows a scenario which in a                           
reassuring way, does not entail such a conclusion. At this stage, it appears that the choice of                                 
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 the quasi­humans­, i.e. unaware­simulations, in the original version of SA, to the detriment of                           
aware­simulations, constitutes an arbitrary choice. In effect, what allows to prefer the choice of                           
the quasi­humans­ over the quasi­humans+? Such a justification is lacking in the context of                           
the argument. At this stage, it turns out that the original argument of SA contains a bias which                                   
leads to the preferential choice of the quasi­humans­, and to the alarming conclusion which is                             






The reference class problem within SA bears, as mentioned above, on the very nature and                             
the type of simulations implemented within the argument. Does this problem limit itself to the                             
preferential choice, at the level of the original argument, of unaware­simulations, to the                         
detriment of the alternate choice of aware­simulations, which correspond to human beings'                       
very sophisticated simulations, capable of creating the illusion, but endowed with the                       
awareness that they are themselves simulations? It seems not. Indeed, as mentioned above,                         
we can also conceive of other types of simulations for which the argument also works, but                               
which are themselves of a slightly different nature. In particular, we can imagine that the                             
post­humans will conceive of and implement simulations that are identical to those of the                           
original argument, but who do not however present a so perfect character. Such a situation                             
presents a completely likely nature and does not present the ethical drawbacks which could                           
accompany the indiscernible simulations hinted at in the original argument. The choice of                         
realizing this type of simulations could result either from the required technological level, or                           
from deliberate and pragmatic choices, intended to save time and resources. We can so                           
conceive of various degrees in the realization of such type of simulations. It could involve for                               
example simulations of very good quality, the artificial nature of which our current scientists                           
could only discover after, say, ten years of research. But in an alternative way, such                             
simulations could be of average quality, even rather rough, with regard to the                         
above­mentioned almost indiscernible simulations. For the sake of the present discussion,                     
however, we shall call rough­simulations this whole category of simulations. 
What are then the consequences on SA of the consideration of a reference class which                             
assimilates itself with rough­simulations? In such circumstances, a large number of such                       
simulations would be detectable by us human beings. In this case, the first­level consequence                           
based on the human beings/simulations disproportion always applies, in the same way as                         
with the original argument. On the other hand, the second level conclusion based on the                             
self­applicability does not apply any more now. For we can no longer conclude from now on                               
that ‘we’ are simulations, since in the presence of any such simulations, we would quickly                             
notice that they consist of simulated human beings and are not genuine human beings. So, in                               
such a case, it turns out that the alarming conclusion inherent to the original version of SA and                                   
based on the self­applicability does no longer apply. A reassuring conclusion substitutes                       
indeed itself to it, based on the fact that we human beings do not belong to this type of                                     
simulations. 
At this stage, it appears that SA, in its original version, opts for the preferential choice of                                 
very sophisticated, undetectable simulations by us human beings and unaware of their nature                         
of simulation. But as mentioned above, we can conceive of other types of simulations, of a                               
more unrefined nature, to which the argument also applies. Until what level of detectable                           
simulation can we go? Do we have to go as far as including in the reference class, at a higher                                       
level of extension, rather unrefined simulations, such as for example some improved versions                         
of the simulations that which we are already capable of realizing by means of computer                             
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 generated images? In this case, this leads to a slightly different formulation from the original                             
argument, for we can then assimilate the class of the post­humans to the human beings who                               
will live on Earth in ten years, or even in one year, or even—at a much greater level of                                     
extension—in one month. In this case, the disjunct (1) according to which humankind will not                             
last until this time does no longer prevail, since such a technological level has already been                               
reached. Also, the disjunct (2) has no longer any raison d'être, since we already realize such                               
unrefined simulations. Thus, there only remains in this case the disjunct (3), which constitutes                           
then the unique proposition which underlies the argument and constitutes the first­level                       
conclusion of SA, according to which the number of the simulated human beings will largely                             
encompass that of the genuine human beings. In this case, it follows well, in an identical way                                 
as with the original argument, the first­level conclusion according to which the number of                           
quasi­humans+ will largely exceed the number of genuine human beings (the disproportion).                       
But there also, the second­level conclusion according to which ‘we’ currently are                       
quasi­humans+ (the self­applicability) does no longer follow. The latter does no longer apply                         






As evoked above, another question that arises is whether the reference class can be                           
widened to the cyborgs and in particular to this category of cyborgs who are indiscernible                             
from human beings. We can indeed conceive of various types of cyborgs, going from those                             
for which some parts of the body have been replaced by synthetic organs of substitution or                               
more powerful, to those for which almost all organs—including the brain—have been                       
replaced. A priori, such a class also enters the field of the argument. Here, the argument                               
applies naturally to those elaborate, indiscernible from human beings cyborgs, for which a                         
large part of the original organs have been replaced or transformed. In particular, the cyborgs                             
for which a part of the brain was replaced by a—partial or not—upload enters naturally the                               
field of the argument. Partial uploads are the ones for which only one part of the brain has                                   
been replaced by an upload. We can also imagine numerous types of uploads of this kind:                               
uploads which reconstitute the memory by restoring the forgotten events can be so                         
envisaged. They can prove themselves useful not only for healthy people, but also for those                             
who suffer from diseases in which the memory functions are altered. We can conceive of that                               
such types of partial uploads could be implemented in a more or less close future (Moravec                               
1998, Kurzweil 2005, Garis & al. 2010). And in the same way as with the original argument,                                 
we can conceive of that very large quantities of these uploads could be realized by computing                               
means. In a general way, it turns out that the discussion about the inclusion of the cyborgs                                 
within the reference class of SA has its importance, because if we consider the class of the                                 
cyborgs in a wide sense, we are nearly already all cyborgs. If we indeed consider that organs                                 
or parts of the human body that have been replaced or improved so that they work correctly                                 
makes us cyborgs, such is today already the case, given the generalization of synthetic teeth,                             
pacemakers, prostheses, etc. So the question arises of up to which degree we can include                             
certain types of cyborgs within the scope of the argument. 
What would then be the effect on SA of taking into account the class of the partial cyborgs,                                   
if we place ourselves at such a degree of extension? As well as for the rough­simulations, it                                 
turns out that the disjunct (1) according to which the human beings will not reach until this time                                   
does no longer prevail, since such a technological stage is already levelled off. In an identical                               
way, the disjunct (2) does not justify itself any more either, because in such a context, we are                                   
already almost all any such partial cyborgs. So, the disjunct (3) only remains in this case as a                                   
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 unique proposition, but which emerges however under a different form from that of the original                             
argument. In effect, the first­level consequence based on the human beings/simulations                     
disproportion also applies here, in the same way as with the original argument. In addition,                             
and it is an important difference here, the second­level conclusion based on the                         
self­applicability also applies, since we can conclude from it that ‘we’ are also, in this wide                               
sense, simulations. On the other hand, the alarming conclusion of the original argument that                           
we are unaware­simulations, which manifests itself at a third level, does no longer follow,                           
since the fact that we are simulations in this sense does not involve here that we are deceived                                   
on our true identity. So there finally ensues, unlike the original argument, a reassuring                           
conclusion: we are simulations, who are fully aware of their own nature of partial cyborgs. 
 
What precedes also shows that by examining SA with attention, we can notice that the                             
argument holds a second reference class. This second reference class is that of the                           
post­humans. What is then a post­human being? Must we assimilate this class to those                           
civilizations that are very widely superior to ours, to those who will evolve either in the XXVth                                 
century or in the XLIIIth century? Must the descendants of our current human race who will live                                 
in the XXIIth century be counted among the post­humans? The fact that important evolutions                           
associated with the increase of human intelligence (Moravec 1998, Kurzweil 2005) can arise                         
in a more or less close future, constitutes in particular an argument which supports this                             
assertion. But must we go as far as including the descendants of the current human beings                               
who will live on Earth in 5 years? Such questions arise and require an answer. The question                                 
of how we have to define the post­humans, also constitutes then an element of the reference                               
class problem of SA. In any case, the definition of the post­humans' class seems closely                             
related to that of the simulations. For if one considers, in a wide sense, those cyborgs hardly                                 
more evolved than we currently are in a certain sense, then the post­humans can be                             
assimilated with the human beings' next generation. The same goes if we consider                         
rough­simulations slightly improved with regard to those that we are currently capable of                         
producing. On the other hand, if we consider, in a more restrictive sense, simulations that are                               
completely indiscernible from our current humanity, it is then worth considering post­humans                       
of a clearly more distant time. In any case, it appears here that the reference class of the                                   






Finally, the foregoing discussion emphasizes the fact that if we consider SA in the light of its                                 
inherent reference class problem, there are in reality several levels in the conclusion of SA:                             
(C1) the disproportion; (C2) the self­applicability; (C3) the unawareness (the worrying fact that                         
we are abused, deceived on our true identity). In fact, the previous discussion shows that (C1)                               
is true whatever the chosen reference class (by restriction or by extension): the                         
quasi­humans­, the quasi­humans+, rough­simulations and cyborg­type simulations. In               
addition, (C2) is also true for the original reference class of the quasi­humans­ and for that of                                 
cyborg­type simulations, but proves however to be false for the class of the quasi­humans+                           
and also for that of rough­simulations. Finally, (C3) is true for the original reference class of                               

















the proportion of the     
simulated human 
beings will largely   
exceed that of the     
human beings   
(disproportion) 
C1A  true  true  true  true 
  the proportion of the     
simulated human 
beings will not largely     
exceed that of the     
human beings 




very probably, we are     
simulations 
(self­applicability) 
C2A  true  false  false  true 
  very probably, we are     
not simulations 





we are simulations     
which are unaware of     
their nature of   
simulation 
(unawareness) 
C3A  true  false  false  false 
  we are not     
simulations which are   
unaware of their   
nature of simulation 









Even though the original conclusion of SA suggests that there is only one single level of                               
conclusion, it turns out however, as it has been revealed, that there are in reality several levels                                 
of conclusion within SA, inasmuch as we examine the argument from a wider perspective, in                             
the light of the reference class problem. The conclusion of the original argument is itself                             
disturbing and alarming, in the sense that it concludes to a much stronger probability that we                               
had imagined it a priori, that we are simulated human beings who are not aware of it. Such a                                     
conclusion results from the path C1­C1A­C2­C2A­C3­C3A of the above tree. However, the                       
preceding analysis shows that according to the chosen reference class, some conclusions of                         
a very different nature can be inferred from the simulation argument. Hence, a conclusion of a                               
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 completely different nature is associated with the choice of the reference class of the                           
quasi­humans+, but also of that of rough­simulations. The resulting conclusion is that we are                           
not such simulations (C2Ā). This last conclusion is associated with the path C1­C1A­C2­C2Ā                         
of the above tree. Finally, another possible conclusion, itself associated with the choice of the                             
class of cyborg­type simulations, is that we belong to such a class of simulations, but that we                                 
are aware of it and that it presents thus nothing disturbing (C3Ā). This last conclusion is                               
represented by the path C1­C1A­C2­C2A­C3­C3Ā. 
Finally, the foregoing analysis casts light on the flaw in the original version of SA. The                               
original argument focuses indeed on the class of simulations which are not conscious of their                             
own nature of simulation. It follows then a succession of conclusions according to which there                             
will be a larger proportion of simulated human beings than genuine human beings (C1A), that                             
we belong to the simulated human beings (C2A) and finally that we are, more probably than                               
we would have a priori imagined it, simulated human beings unaware of their being simulated                             
(C3A). However, as evoked above, the very notion of human beings' simulation—itself                       
associated with the class of the post­humans—shows itself ambiguous, and such a class can                           
be defined in reality by different ways, given that there does not exist, within SA, an objective                                 
criterion allowing to choose such a class non­arbitrarily. In effect, we can choose the                           
reference class by restriction, by identifying the simulations with the quasi­humans­, or with                         
the quasi­humans+; in this case, the post­humans are the ones to which refers the original                             
argument, of a much more distant time than ours. On the other hand, if we place ourselves at                                   
certain level of extension, the simulations assimilate themselves with less perfect simulations                       
than those referred to in the original argument, as well as those of cyborg­type containing                             
evolved uploads; in such a case, the associated post­humans are the ones of a less distant                               
time. Finally, if we make the choice of the class of reference at a greater level of extension,                                   
the simulations are rough­simulations, hardly better than we are at present capable of                         
realizing, or cyborg­type simulations with a degree of integration of simulated parts slightly                         
much­evolved than the one that we know at present; in such a case, the class of associated                                 
post­humans is that of the human beings who will succeed us by a few years. As we can see                                     
it, we can make the choice of the reference class underlying SA at different levels of                               
restriction or of extension. But according to whether the class will be chosen at such or such                                 
level of restriction or extension, a completely different conclusion will follow. So, the choice by                             
restriction of perfect simulations that are unaware of their nature of simulation, as the                           
argument original makes it, leads to a disturbing conclusion. On the other hand, the choice at                               
slightly greater level of extension, of perfect simulations but aware of their nature of simulation,                             
leads to a reassuring conclusion. And also, the choice, at a still greater level of extension, of                                 
rough­simulations or of cyborg­type simulations, also entails a reassuring conclusion. Hence,                     
the preceding analysis shows that in the original version of SA, the choice concerns in a                               
preferential way, by restriction, the reference class of the quasi­humans­, with which a                         
worrying conclusion is associated, whereas a choice by extension, taking into account the                         
quasi­humans+, rough­simulations, cyborg­type simulations, etc., leads to a reassuring                 
conclusion. Finally, the preferential choice in the original argument of the class of the                           
quasi­humans­, appears then as an arbitrary choice that nothing comes to justify, whereas                         
there exist several other classes that deserve an equal legitimacy. For there is no objective                             
element in the statement of SA allowing to make the choice of the reference class                             
non­arbitrarily. In this context, the disturbing conclusion associated with the original argument                       
also turns out to be an arbitrary conclusion, whereas there exists several other reference                           
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3 The present analysis constitutes a direct application to the Simulation argument of the form of dialectical                                 
contextualism described in Franceschi (2014). 
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